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 We present a comparative analysis of the medium-long term perspectives of 
development for sub-Saharan countries in the framework of economic complexity. 
This analysis is made in comparison with the development of Asian tigers. 
Economic complexity is a data-driven framework which aims at providing a more 
scientific basis for the economic theory and it has a specific focus on 
understanding the determinants of growth by means of two new economic 
dimensions: the country fitness and the product complexity. We argue that the 
fitness of countries is a quantitative assessment of those intangible assets, which 
drive the growth. The comparison of this measure for intangibles with monetary 
figures provides effective insights on the growth potential of countries and defines 
the fitness-income plane. 
The analysis of the dynamics in this plane reveals that most sub-Saharans get 
stuck in a pre-industrial regime which can be thought as a generalized poverty 
trap where both income and fitness dimensions are considered. Only Senegal, 
Kenya, Tanzania, Madagascar and Uganda show a behavior compatible with the 
early steps of a long term stable and sustained growth, which resembles the one of 
Vietnam and Malaysia at the beginning of the nineties. As expected, South Africa 
is the most mature economy of the southern part of Africa. However, its trajectory 
highlights the concrete risk of an incomplete development of its productive system 
in terms of diversification, which might concretely jeopardize South Africa’s 
chance to reach the level of wealth of fully developed countries and put the 
country at risk of getting stuck in the so-called middle-income trap. 
1  Introduction 
Understanding the development and growth paths of countries represents one of the key 
challenges of economics in view of its huge societal and political impact. Although economics 
has proposed a number of theories for the determinants of the growth in the last two centuries, 
still nowadays this question appears highly debated and controversial. Even though a systematic 
review of the literature is beyond the scope of this work, the quest to explain the process 
generating stable long term growth and industrialization can be traced back to the very founders 
of the economic theory [Smith (1776); Ricardo (1891)]. In the twentieth century several drivers 
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for the growth have been invoked. On one hand, inspired by Schumpeterian arguments on 
creative destruction [Schumpeter (1934, 1939)], endogenous determinants such as technology 
have been proposed in [Aghion & Howitt (1992); Romer (1990)]. On the other hand, using the 
Ricardian concept of comparative advantage in [Heckscher & Ohlin (1991)] country 
endowments, such as capital and labor are proposed as direct drivers of growth and development. 
However, in the fifties, the validity of this approach has been strongly challenged by the attempt 
to empirically verify the Heckscher-Ohlin theory by Leontief [Leontief (1953, 1956)]. 
The lack of consensus or conclusive answers also characterizes the mechanisms of the very 
first steps of development of an economic system in which the country exits from a subsistence 
level (also known as poverty trap or malthusian regime [Beinhocker (2006)]) and moves towards 
industrialization. Standard economic theories invoke a multiple-equilibria process characterized 
by a step-like development path due to the breakage of successive barriers whereof the nature has 
been proposed in terms of capital [Solow (1956)], demand [Murphy et al. (1988)] or more 
comprehensive factors [Galor & Weil (2000)]. However, among many alternative factors and 
mechanisms thought to be relevant in these very first steps towards industrialization, we can cite 
culture-based arguments [Weber (2002)], geographic [Diamond & Ordunio (2005)], political 
[Acemoglu et al. (2005)] and biological ones [Ashraf & Galor (2013)]. Literature is also very 
debated on the possible outcomes of this exit such as incomplete or partial development: the so-
called middle-income trap [Eichengreen et al. (2013); Kharas & Kohli (2011); Ohno (2009)]. 
The variety of determinants affecting growth is even larger in the empirical literature where 
hundreds of drivers can be listed by analyzing review literature [Levine & Renelt (1992); Sachs 
et al. (1995); Bleaney & Nishiyama (2002)] but no real consensus emerges. The factors which 
have been tested in those works range from capital to other endogenous factors [Auerbach et al. 
(1993); Kormendi & Meguire (1985)] through the fiscal burden, the level of GDP per capita, 
trade openness, human capital, political and institutional system, foreign capital, inflation, 
demographic aspect, natural resources, etc. 
In this paper, we want to address the issue of economic growth for sub-Saharan countries in a 
completely different fashion with respect to previous attempts by means of the framework of a 
novel and strongly data-driven approach, called economic complexity. In analogy with finance 
where price should discount all the available information [Fama (1970)], we argue that the 
productive capacity of countries – as measured by the export basket – is able to, roughly speaking, 
discount the network of capabilities [Lall (2000); Hidalgo & Hausmann (2009); Tacchella et al. 
(2012)] in which the intangible information of the potential of growth and competitiveness are 
encoded. Using a recently proposed measure for this intangible assets [Tacchella et al. (2012); 
Cristelli et al. (2013); Tacchella et al. (2013); Caldarelli et al. (2012)] – the fitness of country – 
and a forecast scheme introduced in [Cristelli et al. (2014)] – the selective predictability scheme – 
we discuss a comparative analysis of the long term scenario of growth for sub-Saharan countries.  
The economic complexity approach permits to cast into a scientific framework key questions as 
whether and which sub-Saharan countries can achieve a sustained and stable development in the 
long term [Ansu (2014)], which countries have started the industrialization process, which 
countries are exiting the poverty trap, and citing [Anyanwu (2014)], whether there are any lesson 
from China (and from Asian tigers), thought to be prototype of emerging and emerged countries.  
The overall picture from the evolution of countries in the plane fitness-income reveals that 
most of sub-Saharan countries are stuck in a pre-industrial state and the majority is still far from 
the region where the early steps of s sustained growth are observed. This pre-industrial regime can 
be thought as a generalized poverty trap which is defined both by the income level and the 
technological level of the country as measured by the fitness [Zaccaria et al. (2014); Cristelli et al. 
(2014); Tacchella et al. (2014)]. Therefore countries which are outside the income poverty trap 
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might be inside the regime we hereafter simply call poverty trap since this regime also depends on 
the fitness dimension. We are arguing the income dimension gives a partial insight on the exit 
process from the poverty trap and we believe a more complete comprenhension can be achieved 
by also considering the fitness.  
Only five countries, namely Kenya, Madagascar, Senegal, Uganda and Tanzania, are exiting 
from the poverty trap. The very early steps of their industrialization process are similar to the path 
followed by most Asian tigers in the past two-three decades. In particular the level of 
sophistication (as measured by the fitness of country) of these five countries resembles the one of 
Vietnam exiting the poverty trap at the beginning of the nineties.  
As a further consideration, it is well-known that Africa’s soil is rich in a number of raw materials 
ranging from oil to minerals. However, differently from what one would expect, we only spot two 
countries characterized by a scenario typical of a raw-material exporter like Gulf countries – high 
GDP per capita but extremely low fitness (log(F)<−2). We can draw two conclusions based on 
this anomaly: on one hand, extensive exploitation of these natural resources is still very marginal 
in many sub-Saharan countries. On the other hand, differently from Gulf countries, Russia and 
other typical raw material-based economies, this might shed light on a general inability to hold the 
capitals which derive from the raw materials. In this second scenario, the chance to use these 
capitals to ignite a diversification and industrialization process are undermined.  
Without surprise, South Africa is the most mature economic system of Africa showing an 
intermediate level of industrial development. Despite a well-established industrialization process, 
South Africa’s long term scenario suggests the risk of an economy unable to fully develop and of 
getting stuck in the middle-income trap due to a poor diversification process of its productive 
system. 
We argue that, within our framework, we can provide effective hints to optimize industrialization 
process, which may accelerate the path of exit from the poverty trap and consolidate the early 
stages of the industrialization process [Zaccaria et al. (2014)]. As an example, these policy 
advises can effectively reduce the risk for South Africa to get stuck in the middle-income trap 
through a smart and efficient planning of the next steps of its industrialization process favoring 
those sectors, which will provide the highest strategic advantage to South Africa.  
The paper is organized as follows: in section 2 we briefly depict the framework of economic 
complexity, in section 3 we give the mathematical details of the methodology defining the metrics 
for the fitness of countries and the complexity of products, in section 4 we present the growth 
scenarios of sub-Saharan countries, in section 5 we discuss the spectroscopy of the emerging sub-
Saharan countries and in section 6 we draw a number of conclusions and discuss the policy 
implications of our analysis. In the appendix A we briefly discuss the datasets and the auxiliary 
methodologies used.  
2  Economic Complexity: an overview 
As mentioned, similarly to finance, in our framework the productive capacity discounts, in a loose 
sense of the word, the information encoded in the network of capabilities and in their mutual 
interaction. In a sense, what a country is able to produce and export is a summary statistic of its 
network of capabilities.  
Specifically, economic complexity refers to a new line of research, which portrays economic 
determinants of growth as a process of evolution of ecosystems of technologies and industrial 
capabilities [Tacchella et al. (2012); Cristelli et al. (2013); Tacchella et al. (2013); Caldarelli et al. 
(2012); Pugliese et al. (2014)]. As a conceptual scheme, the observable bipartite network defined 
by countries and exported products can be thought of as a contraction of a tripartite network 
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where the intermediate layer is the capability level. This level acts as a set of hidden variables 
which represent the intangible assets driving the success and the potential of growth of an 
economic system. This capability level encodes the information on all the determinants of  growth 
and in this perspective, production encodes all the features of these intangibles. Therefore 
products can be used to define a metric which quantitatively assesses capabilities even though 
they can not be directly observed.  
This conceptual scheme acts as a classifier among economic dimensions and identifies a 
hierarchical structure, which marks a strong difference from standard economic approach, 
especially from the empirical literature of this field. The previously mentioned approaches in 
standard economics mainly try to find direct proxies for single capabilities, among widely 
different economic indicators, mostly via a regression approach. On one hand, such an approach 
suffers from the fact that we cannot achieve a comprehensive description and complete list of 
these determinants given the elusive definition of capabilities. On the other hand, the non-trivial 
networked interaction and the heterogeneity of capabilities are completely left out. As a simple 
example, usually the proposed determinants are combined in a additive way in a regression 
scheme while, in general, it is very difficult to assess whether the nature of an indicator is 
additive, multiplicative, mixed or even more complicated. It is also very difficult to determine the 
relative weights when such indices are built.  
Differently, our conceptual scheme proposes an alternative strategy to the direct search for the 
capabilities and, in general, for the drivers of the growth. Our approach pintpoint the productive 
system as the level which reflects the complete information about capabilities: the capabilities 
themselves and their interactions. It is worth noticing that this general framework gives, at the 
same time, a scientific grounding to the empirical drivers of growth and to the forecasting 
schemes for economics. As we are going to see, this perspective indeed permits to measure the 
potential of growth of countries [Cristelli et al. (2014)] and we will use this framework to assess 
the possible paths of development of sub-Saharan economies.  
In practice, this line of reasoning leads to the introduction of non-monetary metrics [Tacchella 
et al. (2012); Cristelli et al. (2013); Tacchella et al. (2013); Caldarelli et al. (2012)] for country 
competitiveness (fitness) and product complexity starting from export data of countries, as proxy 
of the productive system (see Appendix for further details on the dataset). This metrics is the 
fixed point of an iterative Google-like algorithm [Page et al. (1999)] for the bipartite country-
product network defined by the binary country-product matrix. However, the nested structure of 
the bipartite country-product network calls for a non-linear methodology differently from 
Google’s PageRank. We refer to section 3 for the mathematical details of the metrics.  
The fitness is a new economic dimension which quantitatively addresses the complexity and 
diversity of countries’ productive sets. It represents a synthetic measure of the whole network of 
the interaction among capabilities and consequently allows for quantifying the hidden growth 
potential of countries by the comparison with monetary figures such as GDP per capita [Cristelli 
et al. (2014)]. This comparison defines the fitness-income plane where we observe that country 
dynamics exhibits strongly heterogeneous patterns of evolution. The flow, in some zones, is found 
to be laminar while in others a chaotic behavior is instead observed. These two regimes 
correspond to very different predictability features of the country evolution: in the former regime, 
we find strong predictable patterns, while the latter scenario is characterized by a very low 
predictability. In such a heterogeneous framework, new concepts, borrowed from dynamical 
systems theory, are needed to develop a forecasting scheme rather than choosing a standard 
regression approach where the fitness or a derived variable would be used as a regressor. The use 
of a regression approach would inherently and implicitly assume a homogenous response 
framework in strong contrast with the intrinsic observed heterogeneity of country evolution.  
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The empirical finding of a high level of heterogeneity indeed suggests a strong similarity with 
the issue of forecasting the evolution of a dynamical system knowing only its past evolution 
[Lorenz (1969a, 1969b); Cecconi et al. (2012); Cristelli et al. (2014)].  
In summary, Economic Complexity provides a new framework for forecasting the evolution of a 
dynamical system as in the case of weather dynamics [Lorenz (1969a, 1969b); Cristelli et al. 
(2014); Sugihara et al. (2012)]. 
3  Definition of the metrics: the fitness of countries and the 
complexity of products 
The conceptual grounding of our metrics is similar to Google’s PageRank methodology which 
allows to define a quantitative metrics to rank the importance of the nodes of the World Wide 
Web by extracting information from the network. But the mathematical framework is very 
different due to the nested structure1 of the bipartite country-product network as shown in Fig. 1 
where we report the country-product matrix in the year 2004 rearranged according to our metrics .   
  
Figure 1: The nested country-product matrix for the year 2004. 
The entries of this matrix can assume only two values, 0 or 1 depending on whether a country 
is a relevant producer of a product (i.e. whether the country has a Revealed Comparative 
Advantage (RCA) greater than 1, see Appendix for further details on how export flows in USD 
are made binary). The nestedness of this matrix defines the structure of the suitable mathematical 
framework to deal with the information content of the matrix: the fitness of countries and the 
complexity of products must be non-linearly coupled. We indeed get little insight into the 
capabilities required by a product if we only know that a highly diversified country is a producer 
of that product. On the other hand, we obtain insight into the upper bound for the complexity of a 
product if a poorly diversified country (and likely poorly fit) is one of its exporters. Due to the 
nested structure of the matrix, these countries tend to produce only the ubiquitous products made 
                                                      
1 by nested we mean that specialists only interact with generalists, i.e. non-ubiquitous products 
are produced by highly-diversified countries and specialist countries export only ubiquitous 
products 
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by almost all countries and likely requiring fewer (or simpler) capabilities. Consequently, a 
product has a high level of complexity if it is exported by only a small number of countries with a 
high fitness and a country has a high level of fitness if it exports a large number of products, 
appropriately weighted by their complexities. 
Our mathematical specification must therefore reflect the following properties:  
• the fitness of a country is measured in terms of diversity of the productive set weighted by 
the complexity of products;  
• the more countries are able to export a product, the lower is the complexity of the product;  
• the upper bound of the complexity of a product must be dominated by the exporters with 
the lowest fitness.  
The simplest mathematical translation of these concepts are the following self-consistent 
iterative coupled equations for the fitness Fc of countries and the complexity Qp of products:  
 
where Mcp are the entries of the binary country-product matrix. This iterative method is made of 
two steps at each iteration: we first compute the intermediate variables ̃F(n)c  and ̃Q
(n)
p  and then 
normalize them. The initial conditions are ̃Q(0)p =1 ∀p and ̃F
(0)
c =1 ∀c but the method has been 
extensively tested and it has been numerically shown that the point of convergence of the map is 
independent on initial conditions [Cristelli et al. (2013)]. The metrics for the country fitness and 
the product complexity is defined as the fixed point of this process and numerically corresponds 
to the iteration at which the map reaches convergence [Pugliese et al. (2014)]. 
4  The heterogeneous dynamics of economic complexity: sub-
Saharan growth scenarios 
The main tool, within this novel framework, to assess growth scenarios is the fitness-income 
plane: a plane where we report the fitness versus the GDP per capita of countries. As previously 
argued, the comparison of monetary figures with non-monetary information can reveal non-trivial 
hidden potential of country development (we refer to [Cristelli et al. (2014)] for a detailed 
description of this scheme). We now discuss the results of a comparative analysis of sub-Saharan 
countries with respect to the development path of Asian emergent countries. We recall that the 
dynamics in this plane shows two main regimes: a laminar regime characterized by a high degree 
of predictability where the past evolution is a good predictor for future scenarios and a chaotic 
one where predictability drops and fitness is no more the main driver for understanding the 
development of countries.  
In Fig. 2 we report the dynamics of evolution of 46 sub-Saharan countries (see Appendix A 
for the country list) from 1995 to 2012 and the trajectories of the Asian tigers, namely Vietnam 
(VNM), Thailand (THA), Malaysia (MYS), South Korea (KOR) and Singapore (SGP). The 
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dashed black line is the expected level of GDP per capita given the level of fitness2. Consequently 
a country below this line is not reflecting, in terms of income, the complexity of its productive 
system as measured by the fitness, while countries above the line have a level of income which 
can not be explained in terms of the complexity of their productive systems3. The red line instead 
schematically represents the zone of transition between the laminar regime with high 
predictability (right part of the plane) and the chaotic regime with low predictability (left part of 












                                                      
2 This line is the result of the minimization of the Euclidean distance from the line weighted by 
the country GDP  
3 This last scenario does not necessarily imply economic instability because the origin of the 
wealth not explainable in terms of fitness might be due to exogenous sources such as services 
(not covered in our dataset) or raw materials. Many of the countries in the top left corner are 
indeed Gulf countries. 
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Figure 2: The dynamics of country evolution from 1995 to 2012 in the fitness-income 
plane for sub-Saharan countries (light blue trajectories) and five Asian tigers (orange 
trajectories). The black dashed line represents the expected level of GDP per capita given 
the level of fitness, while the red vertical line defines the transition zone between the 
chaotic regime (left part of the plane) and the laminar one (right part). South Africa, as 
expected, appears in a completely different economic regime being the most mature 
economy of the southern part of Africa. Among the remaining countries, Senegal, Kenya, 
Tanzania, Madagascar and Uganda seem to have exited from the chaotic regime and 
from the poverty trap and are entering into a potential flow comparable with the position 
of Vietnam and Indonesia at the beginning of the nineties.  
Most sub-Saharan countries are concentrated (and stuck) in the bottom left corner of the 
chaotic regime which we identify as the poverty trap. In this region, capabilities-driven arguments 
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(and consequently the fitness) compete with several exogenous factors such as civil wars, 
corruption, natural disasters, famine, epidemics, corruption, which dump and prevent the start of 
any effective industrialization process. 
Only Senegal, Kenya, Tanzania, Madagascar and Uganda seem nowadays to be undergoing the 
first steps of industrialization and the consequent exit from the chaotic regime and, in the 
meantime, from the poverty trap. The present position of these countries is compatible with a 
scenario in which these five countries will be able to enter into the stream followed by Asian 
emerging countries like Vietnam and Indonesia in the last two decades. Madagascar deserves a 
special remark: this country has undergone a severe political instability in the last 5 years and it 
would not be identified by standard methods as an economic systems in the early phases of 
industrialization. However, here we find that the country is entering into the laminar regime 
where exogenues instabilities are no more the main driver of the economic evolution. In addition, 
the economic is not only due to a diversfied export basket, as shown in Figs. 4 and 5 and Table 1 
but also to a general trend of increasing production of high complexity products.  
We also observe that a small increase of the complexity of the productive systems of countries in 
the poverty trap but close enough to the transition line (approximately log(F)=−2∼−1) may 
trigger a significant transformation of these economies and societies. Countries like Ethiopia, 
Togo might represent the second wave of african countries undergoing an industrialization and 
development process driven by the fitness. 
The selective predictability scheme [Cristelli et al. (2014)] allows for an estimate of the 
growth rate of these five emerging countries in the period 2012-2022. This scheme is inspired by 
the so-called method of analogues [Lorenz (1969a)] developed within the domain of dynamical 
systems and the grounding idea of this approach is that, in the laminar regime, the past evolution 
of other countries which have passed through the same region of the plane is a provides a good 
forecast for the future evolution of countries now in that region. The more the dynamics is 
laminar, the higher is the predictability of this scheme. In 2012 Kenya, Tanzania, Madagascar and 
Uganda stay in the transition zone between the chaotic and the laminar regime characterized by an 
intermediate degree of predictability. We estimate that Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda will have a 
nominal compound annual growth rate (CAGR) in the period 2012-2022 in the range 11-13% 
while Madagascar in the range 8-10%. The estimation of this CAGR are made in terms of US 
current dollars. Even if inflation and population growth are not included in our forecast, we 






Figure 3: Comparison of BRIC evolution (green trajectories) in the fitness-income plane 
from 1995 to 2012 with South Africa (light blue trajectory) and Asian Tigers (orange). 
Even though South Africa is the most mature African economic system, its trajectory 
reveals the concrete risk of getting stuck in the middle-income trap due to an incomplete 
diversification process in favor of a short term income growth. The three regions, namely 
the poverty trap, the middle-income trap and the developed countries must be viewed 
qualitatively.. The dashed arrows qualitatively represent the paths of countries which 
achieve full development (green lines) and of countries which get stuck in the middle-
income trap (red line) due to a too quick conversion of their fitness potential into 
monetary wealth.  
As a further remark, Nigeria and Democratic Republic of Congo reveal a pattern of growth 
which is typical of raw material exporters like Gulf countries. They have indeed a high level of 
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GDP per capita with respect to other sub-Saharan countries (similar to Indonesia and Vietnam’s 
wealth) but a very low level of sophistication of the productive system.  
South Africa deserves a specific analysis since, as our scheme confirms, it emerges as the most 
mature economic system of the southern part of Africa and, likely, of the continent. South Africa 
(ZAF) is well-outside the poverty trap and its position is steadily in the laminar regime. The 
comparison of the evolution of South Africa with the behavior of BRIC countries, namely Brazil, 
Russia, India and China, is shown in Fig. 3. This reveals non-trivial features of the 
industrialization process of South Africa. BRIC countries, even though extremely similar in terms 
of GDP growth, exhibit very different patterns of development. China and, to a less extent, India 
are undergoing a real diversification of their productive systems. As a result, China and India 
underwent a delayed increase of the monetary wealth (i.e. GDP per capita) but this allowed for the 
development of a strong technological ecosystem, which nowadays is competing with western 
developed countries. Brazil and Russia has instead shifted to short time monetary return rather 
than expanding their high fitness potential and fueled their growth by means of the primary sector. 
South Africa’s behavior in the period from 1995 to 2012 is close to the one of Brazil and Russia. 
In qualitative terms, it can be argued that this poor development of the fitness potential seems to 
lead these countries to an incomplete industrialization process (see Fig. 3) characterized by an 
income which sets Russia, Brazil and South Africa well outside the poverty trap but below the 
region occupied by fully developed countries (top right corner).  
5  Spectroscopy of the emerging sub-Saharan countries 
Spectroscopy is a tool to visualize the structure of the productive system of a country in terms of 
its products’ complexity. Products are ordered according their complexity and, along this axis, we 
plot the export values expressed in USD. In this way, we are able to pinpoint structural features of 
the value distribution of a specific country. In fig. 4 we compare the spectroscopy of the five sub-
Saharan countries in 2010 with Vietnam’s spectroscopy in 1995. On a qualitative basis, the 
spectroscopies of the productive systems of these five countries show a marked similarity with the 




Figure 4: Spectroscopies of Senegal, Kenya, Tanzania, Madagascar and Uganda in 2010 
compared with that of Vietnam in 1995 (top right panel). Export values of product 
(vertical axis) are ordered according to increasing product complexity (horizontal axis).  
In order to assess the evolution of the spectroscopies in the time interval 1995-2010, in Fig. 5 
we evaluate for each country and for each year the box plot of the spectroscopy thought of as a 




Figure 5: Time evolution from 1995 to 2010 of spectroscopy box-plots for Senegal, 
Kenya, Tanzania, Madagascar and Uganda compared with that of Vietnam (top right 
panel). The box borders correspond to the first and third quartile of the spectroscopy, the 
grey dot is the mean while the horizontal black line is the median of the spectroscopy. The 
color intensity measures the yearly variations of the median. The darker is the box, the 
higher is the variation (green for positive and red for negative changes). The pale yellow 
boxes refer to a median change lower than 5 positions. 
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The evolution of the spectroscopy supports the scenario of economies in the early stages of 
the exit from poverty trap which are achieving a stable development regime. This is also 
witnessed by the box-plot range which is, as a general picture, increasing towards high complex 
products .  
Following [Pugliese et al. (2014)], we can estimate the two contributions to the fitness change: the 
diversification-driven term and complexity-driven one.   
 
 Variation due to changes Variation due to changes 
 in the number of products 
in the  export basket 
in the products’ complexity 
 Senegal +478% -75% 
Kenya +158% +68% 
Tanzania +408% +218% 
Madagascar +119% +81% 
Uganda +512% +247% 
 South Africa +0.48% +3.4% 
 Vietnam +156% +89% 
  
Table 1: Decomposition of fitness variations in the two components for the time period 
1995-2010. The variations are reported as a percentage of the initial fitness value for the 
time span in question. 
The five emerging countries are all characterized by both a strong increase in diversification 
and a strong complexification of the export basket expect for Senegal where the fitness increase is 
fueled only via diversification. Once again, the results of this analysis confirm a strong analogy 
between the pattern of development of these countries and that of Vietnam (last row of Table 1). 
On the other hand, the analysis confirms the static and stagnant scenario for South Africa 
whose growth potential is losing momentum.  
6  Discussions 
Economic complexity is a data-driven framework, which aims at casting economic theory (and 
economic analysis) in a more scientific approach.. In this paper, we focus on the paths of country 
development and the determinants of growth and we specifically analyze sub-Saharan countries. 
Differently from the standard approach, we do not directly try to assess the role of a specific set of 
drivers of growth via a regression model. In our framework, the drivers of development – in our 
jargon, capabilities and their network of interaction – play the role of hidden variables whereof 
information is encoded by the productive system of a country, as proxied by the export basket. 
We therefore measure the effect of all determinants as a whole by introducing two metrics: the 
fitness of countries and the complexity of products. The comparison of the information from this 
new economic dimension for countries and the one coming from standard monetary figures (e.g. 
GDP per capita) sheds light on the hidden growth potential of countries. The application of this 
scheme to 46 sub-Saharan countries provide the following scenarios:  
• most countries are trapped in a subsistence regime where no relevant signals of sustained 
development are observed (poverty trap);  
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• although the majority of these countries have huge raw materials reserves, only two 
(namely Democratic Republic of Congo and Nigeria) have a pattern similar to other raw-
material exporters as Russia and Gulf economies. We argue that it can be due to a still 
limited exploitation of these resources or to a structural and political inability to hold back 
the capitals deriving from these activities;  
• only Uganda, Senegal, Kenya, Madagascar and Tanzania appear to have started an 
industrialization process similar, in its early steps, to the one achieved by Asian tigers;  
• South Africa is the only mature economic system even though its path towards full 
development is threatened by the risk of getting stuck in the middle-income trap due to its 
poor diversification which undermines the growth potential.  
Our framework provides direct policy implications and, specifically, suggests policy 
interventions for optimal long term industrial planning. In particular, using techniques to forecast 
the most probable evolution of the export basket of countries [Zaccaria et al. (2014)], it is possible 
to boost growth or, as for South Africa, reduce the risk of entering the middle-income trap by 
means of a country-specific industrial policy favoring the diversification process on strategic 
high-complex sectors.  
A  Materials and Methods 
We use data extracted from the BACI dataset [Gaulier & Zignago (2009)]. This dataset is, in turn, 
grounded on the COMTRADE dataset (freely accessible from the UN Comtrade website4) and is 
the result of a reconciliation procedure extensively discussed in [Gaulier & Zignago (2009)]. This 
dataset, on a yearly basis, reports trading data about more than 200 countries and 5000 products 
classified according to a six digit code (categorization: Harmonized System 20075). We have 
aggregated the dataset at a 4 digits level (the maximum detail corresponds to 6 digits level). 
Products are 1131 at this level of aggregation.  
In order to binarize the raw country-product matrix whereof the entries are the export flow of 
a given product of a given countries in a specific year expressed in USD, we adopt the so-called 
Revealed Comparative Advantage (RCA) criterion [Balassa (1965)]. The RCA matrix defines the 
binary product-country matrix M in the following way: we say that a country c can be considered 
a relevant producer of a product p if RCAcp>1 and therefore the entry Mcp is set equal to 1, 
conversely Mcp=0 if RCAcp≤1. The RCA is defined as the ratio between the fraction of a product 
within the export basket of a country and the fraction of that product over the world export, in 
formula:  
 
where qcp are the entries of the raw export matrix.  




All the remaining economic indicators are extracted from the World Bank dataset6. 
We report the 46 sub-Saharan countries and their codes used throughout this report: Angola 
(AGO), Burundi (BDI), Democratic Republic of the Congo (COD), Rwanda (RWA), Sao Tome 
and Principe (STP), Cameroon (CMR), Central African Republic (CAF), Chad (TCD), Republic 
of the Congo (COG), Equatorial Guinea (GNQ), Gabon (GAB), Kenya (KEN), Tanzania (TZA), 
Uganda (UGA), Eritrea (ERI), Ethiopia (ETH), Somalia (SOM), Botswana (BWA), Comoros 
(COM), Lesotho (LSO), Madagascar (MDG), Malawi (MWI), Mauritius (MUS), Mozambique 
(MOZ), Namibia (NAM), Seychelles (SYC), South Africa (ZAF), Swaziland (SWZ), Zambia 
(ZMB), Zimbabwe (ZWE), Benin (BEN), Mali (MLI), Burkina Faso (BFA), Cape Verde (CPV), 
Cote d’Ivoire (CIV), Gambia (GMB), Ghana (GHA), Guinea (GIN), Guinea-Bissau (GNB), 
Liberia (LBR), Mauritania (MRT), Niger (NER), Nigeria (NGA), Senegal (SEN), Sierra Leone 
(SLE), Togo (TGO). 
 
Acknowledgements 
All the authors thank Yaw Ansu, Chief Economist at ACET (African Center for Economic 
Transformation), for helpful discussions and suggestions. Authors acknowledge CNR Progetto di 
Interesse “CRISIS LAB” and EU Project nr. 611272 “GROWTHCOM”. 
 
References 
Acemoglu, D., Johnson, S., & Robinson, J. A. (2005). Institutions as a fundamental cause of long-run 
growth. Handbook of economic growth, 1, 385–472. 
 
Aghion, P. & Howitt, P. (1992). A Model of Growth through Creative Destruction. Econometrica, 
Econometric Society, 60(2), 323–51. 
 
Ansu, Y. (2014). Growth with Depth. Technical report, African Center for Economic Transformation. 
 
Anyanwu, J. C. (2014). Factors affecting economic growth in africa: Are there any lessons from china? 
African Development Review, 26(3), 468–493. 
 
Ashraf, Q. & Galor, O. (2013). The out of africa  hypothesis, human genetic diversity, and comparative 
economic development. The American Economic Review, 103(1), 1–46. 
 
Auerbach, A. J., Hassett, K. A., & Oliner, S. D. (1993). Reassessing the social returns to equipment 
investment. Technical report, National Bureau of Economic Research. 
 
Balassa, B. (1965). Trade liberalization and ’revealed’ comparative advantage. Manchester School, 33, 99–
123. 
 
Beinhocker, E. D. (2006). The origin of wealth. Harvard Business School Press, Boston, 254–258. 
 
Bleaney, M. & Nishiyama, A. (2002). Explaining growth: a contest between models. Journal of Economic 
Growth, 7(1), 43–56. 
 
                                                      
6 http://data.worldbank.org 
17 
Caldarelli, G., Cristelli, M., Gabrielli, A., Pietronero, L., Scala, A., & Tacchella, A. (2012). A network 
analysis of countries export flows: firm grounds for the building blocks of the economy. PloS one, 
7(10), e47278. 
 
Cecconi, F., Cencini, M., Falcioni, M., & Vulpiani, A. (2012). Predicting the future from the past: An old 
problem from a modern perspective. Ann. J. Phys., 80, 1001. 
 
Cristelli, M., Gabrielli, A., Tacchella, A., Caldarelli, G., & Pietronero, L. (2013). Measuring the intangibles: 
A metrics for the economic complexity of countries and products. PloS one, 8(8), e70726. 
 
Cristelli, M., Tacchella, A., & Pietronero, L. (2014). The heterogeneous dynamics of economic complexity. 
submitted to PLoS ONE. 
 
Diamond, J. M. & Ordunio, D. (2005). Guns, germs, and steel. National Geographic. 
 
Eichengreen, B., Park, D., & Shin, K. (2013). Growth slowdowns redux: New evidence on the middle-
income trap. Technical report, National Bureau of Economic Research. 
 
Fama, E. F. (1970). Efficient capital markets: A review of theory and empirical work. The journal of 
Finance, 25(2), 383–417. 
 
Galor, O. & Weil, D. N. (2000). Population, technology, and growth: From malthusian stagnation to the 
demographic transition and beyond. American economic review, 806–828. 
 
Gaulier, G. & Zignago, S. (2009).  Baci: International trade database at the product-level. 
 
Heckscher, E. F. & Ohlin, B. G. (1991). Heckscher-Ohlin trade theory. The MIT Press. 
 
Hidalgo, C. A. & Hausmann, R. (2009). The building blocks of economic complexity. Proceedings of the 
National Academy of Sciences,  106(26), 10570–10575. 
 
Kharas, H. & Kohli, H. (2011). What is the middle income trap, why do countries fall into it, and how can it 
be avoided? Global Journal of Emerging Market Economies, 3(3), 281–289. 
 
Kormendi, R. C. & Meguire, P. G. (1985). Macroeconomic determinants of growth: cross-country 
evidence. Journal of Monetary economics, 16(2), 141–163. 
 
Lall, S. (2000). The technological structure and performance of developing country manufactured exports, 
1985-98. Oxford development studies, 28(3), 337–369. 
 
Leontief, W. (1953). Domestic production and foreign trade; the american capital position re-examined. 
Proceedings of the American philosophical Society, 332–349. 
 
Leontief, W. (1956). Factor proportions and the structure of american trade: further theoretical and 
empirical analysis. The Review of Economics and Statistics, 386–407. 
 
Levine, R. & Renelt, D. (1992). A sensitivity analysis of cross-country growth regressions. The American 
economic review, 942–963. 
 
Lorenz, E. N. (1969a). Atmospheric predictability as revealed by naturally occurring analogues. J. Atmos. 
Sci, 26, 636–646. 
 
Lorenz, E. N. (1969b). Three approaches to atmospheric predictability. Bull. Am. Meteorol., 50, 345–349. 
18 
 
Murphy, K. M., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1988). Industrialization and the big push. 
 
Ohno, K. (2009). Avoiding the middle-income trap: renovating industrial policy formulation in vietnam. 
ASEAN Economic Bulletin, 26(1), 25–43. 
 
Page, L., Brin, S., Motwani, R., & Winograd, T. (1999).  The pagerank citation ranking: Bringing order to 
the web. 
 
Pugliese, E., Chiarotti, G. L., Zaccaria, A., & Pietronero, L. (to appear, 2014). Economic complexity as a 
determinant of the industrialization of countries: the case of india. 
 
Pugliese, E., Zaccaria, A., & Pietronero, L. (2014). On the convergence of the fitness-complexity algorithm. 
Working paper. 
 
Ricardo, D. (1891). Principles of political economy and taxation. G. Bell and sons. 
 
Romer, P. M. (1990). Endogenous technological change. Journal of political Economy, S71–S102. 
 
Sachs, J. D., Warner, A., Åslund, A., & Fischer, S. (1995). Economic reform and the process of global 
integration. Brookings papers on economic activity, 1–118. 
 
Schumpeter, J. A. (1934). The theory of economic development: An inquiry into profits, capital, credit, 
interest, and the business cycle, volume 55. Transaction Publishers. 
 
Schumpeter, J. A. (1939). Business cycles, volume 1. Cambridge Univ Press. 
 
Smith, A. (1776). The wealth of nations. New York: The Modern Library. 
 
Solow, R. M. (1956). A contribution to the theory of economic growth. The quarterly journal of economics, 
65–94. 
 
Sugihara, G., May, R., Ye, H., Hsieh, C.-h., Deyle, E., Fogarty, M., & Munch, S. (2012). Detecting 
causality in complex ecosystems. science, 338(6106), 496–500. 
 
Tacchella, A., Cristelli, M., Caldarelli, G., Gabrielli, A., & Pietronero, L. (2012). A new metrics for 
countries’ fitness and products’ complexity. Scientific reports, 2. 
 
Tacchella, A., Cristelli, M., Caldarelli, G., Gabrielli, A., & Pietronero, L. (2013). Economic complexity: 
conceptual grounding of a new metrics for global competitiveness. Journal of Economic Dynamics 
and Control, 37(8), 1683–1691. 
 
Tacchella, A., Di Clemente R., G., Gabrielli, A., & Pietronero, L. (2014). The build-up of diversity in 
complex eco-systems. In preparation. 
 
Weber, M. (2002). The protestant ethic and the spirit of capitalism and other writings, edited, translated, 
and with an introduction and notes by peter baehr and gordon c. wells. 
 
Zaccaria, A., Cristelli, M., Tacchella, A., & Pietronero, L. (2014). How the taxonomy of products drives the 
economic development of countries. accepted for publication in PLoS ONE, 
http://arxiv.org/abs/1408.2138. 
